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Unemployment Benefits and Immigration: Evidence from the EU 
 
The paper studies the impact of unemployment benefits on immigration. A sample of 19 
European countries observed over the period 1993-2008 is used to test the hypothesis that 
unemployment benefit spending (UBS) is correlated with immigration flows from EU and non-
EU origins. While OLS estimates reveal the existence of a moderate correlation for non-EU 
immigrants only, IV and GMM techniques used to address endogeneity issues yield, 
respectively, a much smaller and an essentially zero causal impact of UBS on immigration. 
All estimates for immigrants from EU origins indicate that flows within the EU are not related 
to unemployment benefit generosity. This suggests that the so-called “welfare migration” 
debate is misguided and not based on empirical evidence. 
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1 Introduction
In recent years the topic of “welfare migration” has raised controversial discussions and gen-
erated a substantial body of literature. There is concern that excessive participation in welfare
or social security systems might be a more common phenomenon for immigrants than for natives
(Cohen et al., 2009; Nannestad, 2007) or constitute a fiscal burden for host countries (De Giorgi
and Pellizzari, 2009).
The scope of this paper is to explore whether and how changes in countries’ welfare generosity
affect immigration. Instead of using an aggregate measure of welfare, such as total social public
spending (which would include social assistance), this work focuses on unemployment benefits.
These benefits result from a public insurance program in which participation is conditioned on
compulsory contributions during periods of insured work. The contributory nature of the pro-
gram makes immigrants’ benefit recipiency directly linked to their employment experience. As
described by Heitmueller (2005), expected income may be an important factor driving people’s
decision to migrate. Together with earnings during phases of employment, this also includes
unemployment benefits that might be accessed during spells of unemployment. Hence, the
presence of unemployment benefits may increase immigrants’ expected income as well as help
reduce its volatility. As a result, countries with particularly generous unemployment benefits
could attract a greater number of (risk averse) immigrants.
This hypothesis is tested by estimating the correlation between immigration inflows and un-
employment benefit spending (UBS) as a fraction of the gross domestic product for a sample
of European countries. Flows from EU and non-EU origins are analysed separately because
immigrants from these two broad origins are likely to respond in different ways to UBS. This
could be due to, for example, their diverse socio-economic characteristics or the different treat-
ment in terms of immigration legislation (Anastassova and Paligorova, 2005), or even different
eligibility criteria for unemployment program participation. In addition, while immigrants from
EU origins are free to migrate within the EU, migrants from non-EU origins do not have the
same freedom.
Building upon recent studies which have found no (Pedersen et al., 2008) or moderate (De Giorgi
and Pellizzari, 2009) evidence of the welfare magnet hypothesis, the article’s main contribution
is that it systematically studies the endogenous nature of UBS in the context of the welfare
magnet hypothesis. Specifically, two potential channels of reverse causality between immigra-
tion and UBS are explored. The first is a case of simultaneity, whereby immigrants impact UBS
through benefit take-up or by affecting the GDP of a country. This hypothesis is investigated by
estimating the probability of unemployment benefits recipiency, conditional on unemployment,
for both immigrants and natives. By doing so, it is possible to distinguish whether reverse
causality arises due to the composition of immigrant population or due to immigrants’ higher
propensity to be in welfare. The second source of reverse causality relates to how policy reacts
to immigration by cutting (or expanding) UBS. This conjecture is investigated by analysing
whether changes in eligibility criteria and durations of unemployment benefits are associated
with the evolution of immigration patterns.
In order to address the potential endogeneity implied by reverse causality, UBS is instrumented
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with the number of political parties within each winning parliamentary coalition. The rationale
is that social expenditure is likely to be higher (lower) in countries where coalitions comprised
of more (fewer) political parties (Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006). While the ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimates indicate the existence of a moderate welfare magnet effect for non-EU immi-
grants, the implementation of instrumental variable (IV) and generalised method of moments
(GMM) approaches reveals that the impact becomes smaller and statistically insignificant. This
result is taken as evidence that reverse causality produces an upward bias in the correlation be-
tween immigration and UBS. Therefore, failing to account for such a mechanism implies an
overstating of the effect that an exogenous change in UBS would produce on immigration. The
analysis for EU immigrants indicates that they do not react to the UBS in host countries. This
result might also reflect the different nature of within-EU migration.
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews studies about the welfare magnet hypoth-
esis. Section 3 provides a description of the data and related summary statistics. The empirical
strategy is outlined in Section 4, followed by OLS and IV results. Concluding remarks are to
be found in Section 5.
2 Literature review
The focus of the immigration literature on the relationship between welfare and immigra-
tion is rather recent. In the context of immigration to the USA, Borjas (1999) proposes that
since immigrants in the country have already incurred large costs, they tend to cluster in states
offering the highest welfare benefits. Moreover, the generosity of the welfare state will also
affect the skill composition of immigration. In their simulations Brücker et al. (2002) find that
welfare-generous countries attract relatively more low-skilled workers, whilst high-skilled work-
ers prefer to settle in countries where social spending is lower, due to the lower tax burden
needed to finance it. Hence, welfare generosity may induce a negative sorting of immigrants.
In the context of EU enlargement Boeri and Brücker (2005) argue that when the risk of being
unemployed is greater for immigrants than natives, the incentive to migrate increases with the
replacement rate, and mainly for low-skilled individuals.
Several empirical studies have explored the welfare magnet hypothesis. Using the European
Community Household Panel for the period 1994-2001, De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) estimate
the correlation between immigration and the net replacement rate (NRR), used as a proxy for
welfare generosity. The NRR is defined as the ratio between unemployment benefits and aver-
age wages. They find that welfare generosity acts as a magnet for immigrants, but its impact
is relatively weak. On the other hand, labour market conditions in the destination countries
(such as unemployment rates and wages) and networks play a vital role on the decision to move.
A similar analysis was carried out by Pedersen et al. (2008). Their study, based on detailed
immigration flows to OECD countries for the period 1990-2000, mainly focuses on exploring
the impact of social networks on immigration. However, their regression analysis also controls
for total social expenditure, used as proxy for welfare generosity. Results from their preferred
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specification do not support the existence of a positive correlation between immigration and
social expenditure.
To summarise, while theory suggests that immigrants - in particular low-skilled - are more likely
to move to generous countries, there is no strong empirical evidence that this is actually the
case. This paper contributes to the recent empirical evidence in two ways: first it focuses on
unemployment benefits as proxy for welfare generosity. Changes in public insurance programs
affect the total income that working immigrants could obtain in the potential country of des-
tination and hence influence their decision to move. Second, issues of endogeneity of welfare
generosity are directly addressed by exploring reverse causality between UBS and immigration.
3 Data
The sample covers 19 European countries (the EU-15, excluding Greece, for which immi-
gration inflows were not available, plus the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Slovak Republic,
Norway and Switzerland) from 1993-2008.1 Data were accessed from several sources. Gross
immigration inflows come from the OECD Système d’observation permanente des migrations
(SOPEMI) database, which provides consistent and harmonised data over time. These are used
to calculate immigration inflows expressed as percentage of total population in a country. Miss-
ing information on flows from some countries was complemented with the data used in Pedersen
et al. (2008).2 From SOPEMI, information on the stock of foreign-born population was obtained
as well and was used to construct the social network variable (see Pedersen et al., 2008). Data
on UBS were collected from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), which provides
detailed information on social welfare spending in OECD countries.3 Complementary informa-
tion on the characteristics of UBS (such as eligibility criteria and duration) and on expenditure
on family, health and pension programmes was collected as well.4 Finally, statistics on the
unemployment rate and per-capita GDP were obtained from the World Development Indicators
(WDI) online database.5 Data on the number of parties in government coalitions were collected
from the European Election Database.6 Summary statistics are reported in Table A1 in the
Appendix.
1EU-15 member states are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The year
1993 coincides with the abolition of restrictions on internal labour mobility within the then European
Community. Starting the analysis from this period facilitates the distinction between EU and non-EU
flows. The panel is unbalanced because of the unavailability of data for some years. Details are presented
in the Appendix.
2We are grateful to Peder Pedersen, Mariola Pytlikova and Nina Smith for kindly providing us part
of the data used in their paper.
3Source: http://www.sourceoecd.org/database/OECDStat.
4Source: OECD (2002), OECD (2007).
5Source: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/. Per-capita GDP is PPP adjusted and expressed
in 2005 US dollars.
6http://www.nsd.uib.no/european election database/.
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4 Empirical framework and results
The hypothesis that immigration flows are correlated with UBS is tested with the following
econometric model:
mit = α + βxit−1 + z
′
it−1γ + θi + θt + εit (1)
where mit indicates immigration inflows expressed as percentage of the total population in coun-
try i at time t, and xit−1 represents UBS. The equation is estimated for both EU and non-EU
immigration inflows. The matrix zit−1 includes, among other covariates, the social network vari-
able. This corresponds to the stock of immigrants from the same origin of the flows (i.e. either
EU or non-EU) as a percentage of the total population. Per-capita GDP and the unemploy-
ment rate of the destination country are also included in order to control for macroeconomic
fundamentals correlated with immigration inflows. To adjust for the fact that immigrants do
not immediately respond to incentives in the host countries, all explanatory variables are used
in their lagged values. Lags might also address problems of endogeneity, but only partially,
especially if persistent unobservable shocks contained in the error term are correlated with both
the response variable and the covariates in the left hand side of equation (1). Issues of endo-
geneity are explored in the next subsection, where IV and GMM approaches are discussed.
The model is estimated using country fixed effects; hence, the parameter of interest (β) repre-
sents the correlation between immigration inflows and UBS estimated through within-country
changes. Year dummies are included as well to control for time-varying shocks common to all
countries. In addition, an indicator for the years after the 2004 EU enlargement is introduced
to capture changes in immigration patterns common to all receiving countries.7 Due to the
inhomogeneous size of countries, observations are weighted by population size.8
4.1 OLS results
Table 1 reports the results of the estimation of OLS regression of equation (1). For sake
of comparison, column (a) reports the results of the model without UBS. In such a model one
would expect all components of zit−1 to be correlated with immigration flows. For example,
immigrants are more likely to choose locations where individuals from the same origin have
already settled. Similarly, a higher per-capita GDP and better employment conditions are
expected to attract, all things being equal, more immigrants. The estimates of networks, GDP
and unemployment rate seem to confirm this hypothesis; however, the correlation is economically
and statistically stronger for non-EU individuals.9 For non-EU immigrants GDP is positively
7While the inclusion of this variable does not substantially change the estimates, it does generally
improve the fit of the model.
8Since weights must be constant when fixed effects are used, population size in the year 2000 is chosen.
Sensitivity tests are carried out to assess the impact of observation weighting.
9 For example, a change in the stock of EU immigrants of 0.1% (e.g., from the mean value of 4.5 to
4.6%) is associated with an increase of immigration flows which varies between 0.012 and 0.014% across
specifications (at the mean value this corresponds to an increase from 0.44 to around 0.45%). On the
contrary, the increase of EU immigration flows associated with a 0.1% change in the network (e.g., from
the mean value of 2.0 to 2.1%) is around 0.01% (at the mean value this corresponds to an increase from
0.12 to less than 0.13%).
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correlated with immigration (the point estimates vary between 0.017 and 0.019 across models),
while for immigrants coming from EU countries, this correlation is essentially zero.10 While for
neither groups of immigrants is it possible to reject the null hypothesis that unemployment is
correlated with immigration, the size of the estimate would have been, in any case, negligible.11
In column (b), UBS is added to the specification. The estimated coefficient is positive for non-
EU immigrants, but negative for EU immigrants, although imprecisely estimated. Taken at
its face value, the estimate of 0.058 for non-EU immigrants means that a 1% change in UBS
is associated with a change in immigration flows of less than 0.01%. A practical example is
useful: if the UK were to experience a substantial increase in UBS from, say, 1.13% (the mean
value) to 3.15% (the mean value in Germany), then there would be an associated change in
immigration flows from 0.45% to 0.57%. In this particular case a growth of UBS of a factor
of nearly three correlates with a growth of about 1/4 in immigration flows. In contrast, the
estimated coefficient for EU immigrants is essentially zero in terms of economic impact.
In column (c), a model which includes other major social expenditure components (health,
pensions and family) is estimated. The rationale is to control for potential omitted variables
that might confound the correlation between UBS and immigration flows. After including these
additional components, the estimate of UBS for non-EU immigrants increases only slightly
(0.061 vs 0.058); however, this difference, besides being statistically insignificant at the 10%
level, is also very small in terms of size. Similarly for EU immigrants, the addition of other
expenditure components does not affect the essentially zero estimate.12 Finally, in column (d),
a model without weights is estimated. The UBS point estimates are, in absolute terms, slightly
larger, although the general pattern remains unchanged. The weighted estimates are generally
preferred, especially for non-EU immigrants, as they are closer to the predictions of migration
theory both in terms of signs and magnitude.
In summary, the OLS analysis demonstrates that there is moderate association between UBS
and non-EU immigration inflow; however, the same cannot be said of EU immigrants. It should
be noted that these results are mere correlation estimates. Hence a more causal interpretation
would require assessing how unobservable factors attract immigrants. The following section
examines the potential threat to the internal validity of these results due to reverse causality.
10 Since the logarithm of GDP is used in the regression, the estimate for non-EU immigration flows
means that a 1% change on GDP is associated with a change of immigration flows from 0.44%, the mean
value, to around 0.45%.
11Since the inclusion of fixed effects absorbs cross-country, time-unvarying differences, a potential ex-
planation for this weak relationship is that unemployment within each country does not vary substantially
over time. Inspection of the unemployment rates confirms this conjecture: only Ireland, the Slovak Re-
public and Spain exhibit important changes during the period under analysis, while unemployment rates
are rather constant for the remaining countries.
12The estimates of the other components for non-EU immigration flows are 0.066 (s.e. 0.035) for family
expenditure, -0.028 (s.e. 0.014) for health expenditure and -0.039 (s.e. 0.025) for pension expenditure.
For EU flows, the corresponding estimates are -0.001 (s.e. 0.010), 0.004 (s.e. 0.006) and -0.011 (s.e.
0.008).
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Table 1: OLS estimates of immigration inflow rates
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Non-EU immigrants
UBS 0.058** 0.061* 0.066***
(0.028) (0.031) (0.021)
Stock of non-EU immigrants 0.141*** 0.129*** 0.123*** 0.079*
(0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.039)
Per-capita GDP 0.017** 0.019** 0.018** 0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
Unemployment rate -0.007 -0.015 -0.005 -0.026
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
Constant -0.056** -0.063** -0.053** -0.020
(0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.014)
R̄2 0.64 0.65 0.68 0.52
EU immigrants
UBS -0.009 -0.003 -0.012
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Stock of EU immigrants 0.072*** 0.075*** 0.068** 0.094***
(0.021) (0.025) (0.027) (0.021)
Per-capita GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Unemployment rate 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Constant 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
R̄2 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.37
Weights Y Y Y N
Other welfare components N N Y N
N 248 248 248 248
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1% level. All
models are estimated by country fixed effects and contain year dummies. Weights are population counts of
each country in the year 2000. Other welfare components are expenditure on health, family and pensions.
4.2 Is unemployment benefit spending endogenous?
Two potential channels of endogeneity that might threaten the causal interpretation of the
OLS estimates are now discussed. Both are cases of reverse causality, whereby social expenditure
is a function of immigration. Presence of simultaneity bias is best explained by the means of




m = βs + ε
s = γm + η
(2a)
(2b)
Equation (2a) is a simplified version of (1), and equation (2b) states that social welfare spending
is a function of immigration. Estimation of (2a) by OLS will lead to simultaneity bias, since:
p limβ = β
OLS
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Equation (3) shows that the size and magnitude of the bias depend (among other things) on
the size and magnitude of γ, which capture the impact of immigration on spending. For exam-
ple, the OLS analysis might conclude that there is a positive (negative) welfare magnet effect.
However, the true, exogenous impact of UBS on immigration could be much smaller (larger)
in presence of positive (negative) bias. The following two channels of simultaneity bias are
explored: a) the co-determination of immigration and UBS and b) the responsiveness of welfare
policies to immigration.
The first possible channel is a consequence of the simultaneous determination of immigration
and UBS. This occurs because immigrants access welfare and hence they affect s, the level of
spending in equation (2b). Moreover, since UBS is expressed as a percentage of GDP, immigra-
tion simultaneously affects both the numerator (the amount of spending) and the denominator
(how immigrants participate to the GDP through consumption, taxes and welfare spending).
While it is difficult to provide a precise assessment of the effect of immigration on welfare
spending, an indirect account can be given by comparing the welfare use of immigrants to na-
tives. This is done in Table 2, where data for unemployment benefit recipiency are reported
for natives, EU immigrants and non-EU immigrants for the years 2005-2008. In particular, the
first three columns report the unconditional take-up rates (percentage of individuals in each
group who receive unemployment benefits). With few exceptions, non-EU and EU immigrants
show substantially higher unconditional probabilities of taking-up unemployment benefits than
natives, determining a “disproportional” spending attributable to immigrants. However, these
raw statistics do not take into account the diverse composition of immigrant groups. To this
aim, the remaining columns of Table 2 report the probability of receiving unemployment bene-
fits conditional on unemployment status and on socio-demographic characteristics (see Brücker
et al., 2002).13 After controlling for these characteristics, there is no longer evidence that im-
migrants take-up benefits more than natives; if anything, immigrants (particularly those from
non-EU origins) exhibit lower rates of unemployment benefit recipiency. This evidence is in
line with Barrett and Mâıtre (forthcoming), who find that after conditioning for unemployment
status, immigrants are less likely than natives to receive unemployment benefits. On the one
hand, the disproportional benefit spending attributable to immigrants suggests that it is indeed
important to take into account reverse causality, as immigration might then lead to increased
welfare spending. However, the figures in Table 2 also suggest that the relatively higher spending
attributable to immigrants is the result of the composition of immigrant population rather than
a consequence of their residual propensity to take-up welfare (holding characteristics constant).
The second possible cause of simultaneity bias explored is related to the responsiveness of
unemployment benefit policies to immigration, given that institutions in the host country could
intervene on expenditure legislation in response to high immigration. For example, if there
is the perception of excessive expenditure caused by immigrant welfare dependency (i.e., im-
migrants take-up benefits more than they supply to the system through social contributions),
13A probit model is estimated for each of the three groups, pooling EU-SILC data for the years 2005-
2008. The dependent variable is the probability of accessing unemployment benefits conditional on being
unemployed. The explanatory variables contain gender, age, education and dummies for the country of
residence. Observations are weighted by population size. Full estimates are available upon request.
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Table 2: Unemployment benefit recipiency, 2005-2008
Unconditional take-up rates Conditional take-up rates
Country Natives Non-EU EU Natives Non-EU EU
Austria 0.091 0.195 0.106 0.631 0.661 0.567
Belgium 0.148 0.193 0.162 0.813 0.766 0.772
Czech Republic 0.049 0.035 0.049 0.331 0.242 0.232
Denmark 0.201 0.335 0.242 0.639 0.747 0.757
Finland 0.188 0.464 0.233 0.846 0.853 0.871
France 0.097 0.148 0.091 0.546 0.495 0.519
Germany 0.113 0.153 0.721 0.715
Hungary 0.071 0.028 0.040 0.543 0.324 0.600
Ireland 0.108 0.093 0.092 0.622 0.495 0.543
Italy 0.121 0.204 0.184 0.239 0.285 0.314
Luxembourg 0.021 0.059 0.049 0.269 0.307 0.406
Netherlands 0.051 0.065 0.060 0.448 0.236 0.511
Norway 0.044 0.102 0.054 0.351 0.378 0.316
Portugal 0.046 0.050 0.056 0.325 0.295 0.301
Slovak Republic 0.030 0.013 0.175 0.109
Spain 0.066 0.061 0.066 0.326 0.230 0.253
Sweden 0.102 0.160 0.098 0.380 0.315 0.393
United Kingdom 0.017 0.025 0.017 0.368 0.331 0.324
Average 0.086 0.124 0.103 0.487 0.458 0.447
Source: EU-SILC 2005 to 2008. Notes: Breakdown by EU/non-EU immigrants not available, figures
refer to the average rate for the two groups. Data for Switzerland are not available.
then governments are more prone to reform aspects of the public insurance system that might
discourage immigration (or favour return migration), such as eligibility criteria (contributions)
and durations. Changes in these characteristics will, in turn, influence the level of UBS.14 If
this is the case, one would expect high-immigration countries to implement austere changes in
the unemployment benefit system. To explore this hypothesis, Table 3 reports the levels of and
the changes in the eligibility criteria (expressed by the months of employment contributions
necessary to qualify for unemployment benefit) and in the duration of unemployment benefits,
for the period 1999-2007 (for which these data are available). Countries have been ranked in
terms of non-EU immigration impact, represented by the change in the stock of immigrants as
percentage of the population. There is no evidence that high immigration countries adopted
more restrictive measures in terms of eligibility criteria. On the contrary, unemployment benefit
duration has been reduced more in countries with relatively lower changes in immigration. This
suggests the existence of a positive, although weak, impact of immigration on UBS, and further
justifies the efforts to explore the reverse causality in welfare magnet hypothesis.
14For example, Razin et al. (2002) argue that migration (in particular low-skilled migration) may
lead to a lower tax burden in the long-run. They reason that there will be income redistribution as a
consequence of immigration, with native-born individuals moving towards the higher (and anti-tax) part
of the income distribution.
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Table 3: Employment contributions and durations of unemployment benefits
Country Stock non-EU Stock EU Contributions Durations
∆ ∆ In 1999 ∆ In 1999 ∆
Spain 7.85 1.58 12 0 24 0
Luxembourg 4.72 1.15 7 0 12 0
Italy 3.45 -0.02 12 0 6 1
United Kingdom 2.40 0.10 24 -12 6 0
Ireland 1.61 0.06 10 0 15 0
Portugal 1.59 0.32 18 -9 30 -6
Czech Republic 1.41 0.16 12 0 6 0
Norway 1.30 0.34 12 0 36 -12
Finland 0.72 0.10 11 0 25 -2
Austria 0.62 0.74 12 0 10 -1
Switzerland 0.52 1.12 6 6 7 11
Denmark 0.34 0.25 12 0 60 -12
Sweden 0.26 -0.03 6 0 15 -1
Slovak Republic 0.21 0.21 24 12 9 -3
Hungary 0.16 0.08 12 0 12 -3
France 0.07 0.12 4 2 60 -37
Netherlands 0.01 0.07 7 0 60 -22
Belgium -0.01 0.38 21 6 60 0
Germany -1.24 0.50 12 0 12 0
Source: OECD (2002, 2007). Note: ∆ indicates changes between 1999 and 2007 (for the stocks:
expressed as percentage of total population). Employment contribution is given by the number of
months of insured work needed for unemployment benefit entitlement. Duration of unemployment
benefits is expressed in months.
4.3 IV estimates
The potential endogeneity issues just discussed can be addressed by means of an IV approach.
In other words, in order to provide a causal interpretation to the welfare magnet hypothesis, a
variable which is correlated with the exogenous part of expenditure but not with immigration
shocks is required. The number of parties in the government coalition is chosen as the IV for
UBS. This choice is motivated by an empirical study by Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006), which
shows that public sectors are larger when coalitions are formed by more political parties. The
rationale is that in larger coalitions each party is liable only for a fraction of the government
political choices, resulting in greater public spending.15
The relevance of the instrument is explored by examining the first stage of the regression. This is
done in Figure 1, where values of UBS (conditioning for all covariates in equation (1) are plotted
against the number of parties in the government coalition. The figure shows a strong correlation
between the two variables - in particular, the estimate of the number of parties is 0.0019 (s.e.
15A similar argument is used by Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002), who document that proportional sys-
tems favour social welfare spending, while majoritarian systems are more likely to redistribute resources
through public goods.
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0.0006).16 Instrument exogeneity requires that the number of parties is not correlated with the
error term in the immigration equation. Although it is possible that election results are affected
by immigration rates or that new parties arise as a consequence of high immigration, this is
unlikely to alter the composition of the winning coalition in terms of number of parties it is
composed of. In order to provide further evidence to the results above, a dynamic model is
considered, whereby the lagged immigration inflows is included as explanatory variable. The
Arellano-Bond’s system GMM technique is employed as the estimating strategy.17








0 2 4 6 8
 
Notes: The size of the circles is proportional to the population size of countries.
Table 4 presents the results related to IV and GMM estimations. After taking endogeneity
into account, the coefficient for non-EU immigrants is essentially zero and statistically insignif-
icant. On the one hand, these estimates suggest that, in the context of unemployment benefits,
the welfare magnet hypothesis seems not at work; on the other hand, they reveal the presence
of an upward bias in the OLS. For EU immigrants, IV and GMM estimates confirm the absence
of any effect, as found in Table 1.18
16Shea’s R2 is 0.11 and the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic is 26.78. In only three countries (Austria,
Luxembourg and the United Kingdom) did the number of parties in the governing coalition exhibit no
variation over time.
17System GMM is an augmented version of GMM that uses system of two equations, one differenced
and one in levels. Variables in levels are instrumented with their first differences to increase efficiency.
The second lag of the endogenous variables is used as instrument because it is not correlated with the
error term.
18In the GMM estimates, essentially all regressors are insignificant, since most of their explanatory
power is absorbed by the lagged dependent variable.
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Table 4: IV and Arellano-Bond estimates of immigration inflow rates
Non-EU immigrants EU immigrants
IV GMM IV GMM
UBS 0.040 -0.013 -0.004 0.001
(0.065) (0.034) (0.022) (0.007)
Immigrants inflow (t-1) 0.785*** 1.037***
(0.123) (0.152)
Stock of immigrants 0.133*** 0.002 0.073*** -0.015
(0.018) (0.021) (0.014) (0.016)
Per-capita GDP 0.019*** 0.004 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployment rate -0.012 -0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.011) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001)
Constant -0.068*** -0.013 0.002 0.000
(0.012) (0.011) (0.005) (0.002)
N 248 248 248 248
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1% level.
All models are estimated using country fixed effects and contain year dummies. All regressions are
weighted by the counts of individuals in each country in the year 2000. Instrument is the number
of parties in the winning parliamentary coalition. IV estimates are computed using Stata command
xtivreg2 developed by M.E. Schaffer (Schaffer, 2005). GMM estimates are obtained using Stata
command xtabond2 by D. Roodman (Roodman, 2009).
The presence of endogeneity indicates the existence of effects from immigration on UBS. It
remains a topic for further research whether this is because immigrants access unemployment
benefits with different intensity than natives, or because their contribution to GDP is relatively
different to their program participation, or, finally, because policy makers’ welfare generosity
responds to immigration. Evidence was provided that these channels may be operative.
5 Conclusions
This paper has explored the role of UBS on immigration using a sample of EU countries
during the period 1993-2008. While the OLS analysis revealed the presence of a moderate corre-
lation between social welfare spending and immigration from non-EU origins, the IV and GMM
estimates indicate that the causal effect is smaller and statistically insignificant, thereby reject-
ing the welfare magnet hypothesis. All estimates for EU immigrants are essentially zero, which
suggests that immigration within the EU does not respond to unemployment benefit incentives.
Although the results are robust across specifications, it is important to point out potential lim-
itations of the analysis. On the one hand, the absence of information detailing the country of
origin, especially for immigration from outside the EU, might be confounding the existence of
welfare magnet effects. Although the effect of UBS on immigration is zero on average, it is not
possible to exclude that for immigrants from certain origins, unemployment benefits constitute
a strong incentive to immigrate. Future availability of detailed data will allow the exploration
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of this hypothesis. As for EU immigrants, the finding that the estimated effect is essentially
zero could be determined by either the fact that they are more skilled, and hence less likely to
be attracted by welfare states (Brücker, 2002), or simply by their freedom of movement within
the EU, which leads them to rely on (or refer to) their home country unemployment benefit
system.
Finally, some descriptive evidence that the positive correlation between welfare and immigration
arises due to two channels was provided. First, inappropriate immigration policies in Europe
may lead to an adverse composition of immigrants, which in turn results in a higher unemploy-
ment benefit take-up rate on the part of immigrants. Second, welfare policies may become more
generous in wake of immigration. These are fruitful areas for future research.
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a) Description of SOPEMI database
Information on stocks and inflows of foreign population in European countries is taken from the
SOPEMI database. Data on foreign population and nationals is generally collected either from
population registers or residence permit database, and covers the following periods: Austria
1996-2008, Belgium 1993-2007, Czech Republic 1995-2008, Denmark 1993-2007, Finland 1993-
2008, France 1994-2008, Germany 1993-2008, Hungary 1995-2008, Ireland 1994-2004, Italy 1993-
2007, Luxembourg 1993-2006, Netherlands 1993-2008, Norway 1993-2008, Portugal 1993-2007,
Slovak Republic 1993-2008, Spain 1998-2007, Sweden 1993-2003, Switzerland 1993-2008, United
Kingdom 1997-2008.
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